In Chapter 3 we concluded that industrial farming cannot be continued "the way it has been."
So where do we go? At this point, the discussion often swings to several extremes.
- A: the government should fix it — protect conventional farming through subsidies, price supports, and trade negotiations, and raise the food self-sufficiency rate via domestic production increases
- B: aim for full self-sufficiency — end overseas dependence and build a system where Japan alone can feed itself
- C: abandon industrial farming entirely — reject chemical fertilizers, agrochemicals, and the very technology of modern agriculture, and convert immediately and completely to organic / natural farming
Each of these carries strong problem statements and arguments. Vulnerability of food security, collapse of domestic agriculture, the limits of chemical-fertilizer dependence — as diagnoses, much of it is correct. It is consistent with the facts laid out in Chapters 1 through 3 of this series.
But each of the proposed solutions (the prescriptions) becomes empty talk in front of the physical constraint of fertilizer supply. This chapter examines
- the difficulty of the prescription that raises the energy-based food self-sufficiency rate via domestic production increases
- the difficulty of the prescription that uses Japanese-style circular livestock farming to break free from imported feed
- the meaninglessness of the binary "immediate full abandonment vs. preservation of industrial farming" itself (under fertilizer constraints, industrial farming ends automatically)
and on that basis, lays out the "middle road" this series stands on — gradual transition to regenerative agriculture domestically + international promotion of regenerative agriculture + supplementary imports from a re-distributed global supply network.
4.1 Raising the Energy-Based Food Self-Sufficiency Rate Is Difficult
In recent debate, the following prescription is often proposed.
- The calorie-based food self-sufficiency rate is 38% (the lowest among developed countries)
- Repeal the rice-acreage-reduction policy immediately and shift to increased production of staple rice, wheat, and soybeans, raising the rate to 49%
- A "Japanese-style direct-payment system" (income compensation modeled on the West) protects farmers from price volatility
- Use feed rice to break free from feed import dependence
The problem-statement portion of these proposals overlaps with this series' arguments at many points. The recognition that Japan's food supply system is fragile, and that market forces alone cannot maintain the agricultural base, is shared.
But the prescription itself — raising the energy-based (calorie-based) self-sufficiency rate via domestic production increases — has structural difficulties.
Difficulty 1: Chemical Fertilizers and Energy Cannot Structurally Be Domesticated
As we saw in Chapter 1,
- Self-sufficiency in chemical fertilizer raw materials is near 0%
- All raw material for phosphate fertilizer is imported
- Raw material for nitrogen fertilizer (natural gas) is also import-dependent
- Potash fertilizer is imported from Canada, Russia, and Belarus
- The sulfur needed for chemical fertilizer manufacture is a byproduct of Middle East oil refining
- Farm-machinery fuel and greenhouse heating are also fossil fuels → Middle East dependence
In other words,
To raise the food self-sufficiency rate, you need to raise the fertilizer / energy self-sufficiency rate. But fertilizer and energy, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, cannot structurally be domesticated.
"Increase rice to substitute for wheat," "increase feed rice to substitute for imported corn" — looking only at the food numbers, this direction does raise the self-sufficiency rate. But the fertilizer, fuel, and farm machinery needed to grow that rice remain import-dependent.
"A discussion of food self-sufficiency that ignores the origin of the means of production is a deception" — consistent with this series' point in Chapter 3.
The harder you push the domestic-production-increase shift, the more your dependence on imported fertilizer and imported energy actually grows — that is the paradox.
Difficulty 2: Rigidity of the Price Structure — Domestic Prices Don't Track World Prices
The proposal "protect farmers from price volatility with a direct-payment system" also runs into the problem of domestic retail price rigidity that we saw in Chapter 1.
| Year | Superphosphate retail (20kg) | World compound fertilizer price |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 1,800 yen | normal |
| 2022 | 3,400 yen (peak) | $815 / ton |
| 2024 | 2,900 yen | $327 / ton |
World prices fell to less than half from the 2022 peak, but domestic prices remain elevated. The main causes are the weak yen and the time lag for manufacturers to work down inventory. Setting up a direct- payment system does not change this exchange-rate / market structure.
Difficulty 3: Fiscal Constraints
To introduce direct payments seriously at Western levels could require on the order of trillions of yen per year in budget.
Given Japan's fiscal situation, population decline, the natural growth of social-security spending, and increased defense spending — in the budget-allocation competition among these, whether there is room to sustain agricultural spending of this scale is extremely uncertain.
Conclusion: Raising the Self-Sufficiency Number Is Not the Core of the Solution
The goal "raise the calorie-based food self-sufficiency rate from 38% to 49%" does not deny the importance of the diagnostic problem statement. But achieving it would not fundamentally strengthen Japan's food security (fertilizer and fuel remain imported).
The problem is not the self-sufficiency number; it is the structure of the entire supply chain.
4.2 Japanese-Style Circular Livestock Farming Doesn't Pencil Out Under Fertilizer Constraints
Another commonly proposed prescription is "Japanese-style circular livestock farming (resource-circulating agriculture)."
- Break free from excessive dependence on imported feed (corn, etc.)
- Make full use of domestic paddies to produce feed rice
- Feed it to chickens, pigs, cattle, and other livestock
- Return livestock manure to the paddies as compost
- Spread "eggs and pork raised on rice"
As an ideal it is beautiful. But in fertilizer-constrained Japan, this model does not structurally pencil out. There are three reasons.
Difficulty 1: There Is No Room to Grow "Feed Rice" — Even Food Rice Will Be Short
The core of this model is producing feed rice in the paddies. But this is where the biggest structural problem lies.
- Self-sufficiency in chemical-fertilizer raw materials is near 0% (Chapter 1)
- China's export halt, the logistics paralysis at the Strait of Hormuz, PFAS regulation — three routes constrict simultaneously
- Phosphate fertilizer stays structurally elevated, and quantities thin out
In a phase where fertilizer drops sharply, the rice obtained from limited fertilizer input and limited farmland must first go to food.
In a situation where even food rice may be short, Japan does not have the room to deliberately allocate paddies to feed rice.
In fact, the Reiwa rice shock (2024–2025) revealed shortages severe enough that the government initially denied the release of stockpiled rice. That was under conditions where fertilizer was being applied at peacetime levels. If fertilizer thins out in earnest, rice yields per unit area will fall further. Paddies become objects of competition under food priority.
The model "make full use of paddies, produce feed rice, support livestock with it" rests on the premise that 'fertilizer is sufficient.' When the premise collapses, the model does not pencil out.
Difficulty 2: You Can't Sustain Livestock on Grass Alone — The Physical Limit of Pasture Area
"Then drop compound feed and run livestock centered on grassland" — that idea also comes up. In fact, pasture-based, grassland-centered livestock farming is an important element of regenerative agriculture (Allan Savory's holistic management and so on, detailed in Chapter 6).
But under Japan's geographic conditions, this too has a limit.
Raising 1 head of cattle on grass alone requires roughly 1 hectare or more of pasture
[unverified: Hokkaido dairy standard].
Japan's nationwide arable area is 4.239 million hectares (2025, detailed in Chapter 7). Even if every bit of arable land were converted to pasture,
- The maximum number of cattle that could be raised is about 4 million head
- To meet domestic beef and milk demand by grassland grazing alone, the arithmetic says almost all current arable land would have to be converted to pasture
- That leaves no land to grow crops (rice, wheat, beans, vegetables)
Average arable area per management entity is 3.6 ha (2.6 ha in the prefectures outside Hokkaido) — the maximum cattle that can be supported by grass alone is a few head. This falls far short of the scale of "livestock farming that supports food supply for the entire population."
In addition, in Japan's terrain — full of terraced paddies and stepped fields — land that can be used contiguously as pasture is limited. Outside parts of Hokkaido, the topographic conditions for grassland- centered livestock farming at scale are scarce to begin with.
Difficulty 3: Without Compound Feed, Even a Few Chickens or Pigs Cannot Be Sustained
A few household chickens and pigs at "self-sufficient scale" might appear viable at first glance, but looking at the structure they face the same difficulty.
- Laying hens routinely need compound feed (mostly grain) in ratio to body weight
- Pigs are omnivorous, but to raise them seriously, grain feed is needed
- Sustaining tens of birds or several pigs on scraps and vegetable trimmings alone falls short in absolute quantity
- Even raising for self-sufficiency, the premise that grain feed can be obtained cheaply has collapsed
Feeding a few chickens on household kitchen scraps and leftovers — at this level, it is possible even under fertilizer constraints. But this is not a scale that can be called "livestock farming," and it does not become a major source of animal protein.
Conclusion: Japanese-Style Circular Livestock Farming Cannot Be a Modern Food Supply Strategy
To summarize:
| Element | Reality under fertilizer constraints |
|---|---|
| Feed rice in paddies | Impossible — even food rice is short, so paddies go to food first |
| Grassland-centered large livestock | Limited — 1 ha per head; Japan's arable area cannot support national demand |
| Livestock on compound feed (pigs, chickens) | Difficult — requires stable grain feed supply, but that premise has collapsed |
| Household few chickens (kitchen scraps) | Possible, but not at a scale that supports food supply as strategy |
In other words,
Japanese-style circular livestock farming is attractive as a philosophy, but as a food supply strategy for a fertilizer-constrained Japan, it does not pencil out. Livestock itself, in the era this series envisions, can only move in the direction of substantial contraction from current levels.
Implication: Animal Protein Shifts to Seafood, Plant Protein, and "Imported Regenerative Meat"
This carries an implication for diet itself.
In fertilizer-constrained Japan, the major sources of animal protein become
- Seafood (fisheries — these have their own constraints, but independent of agricultural fertilizer constraints)
- Plant protein (soy products — miso, natto, tofu, soy sauce — rely on legume nitrogen fixation and are less dependent on fertilizer, Chapter 5)
- Small-volume domestic livestock (mountain grazing, a few household chickens — ultra-small-scale and local)
- Imported regenerative pasture meat (below)
- Preserved food (dried fish, pickles, fermented food — buffering seasonal variation)
"Livestock Japan Can't Do" Is Done by Countries That Can
Here the core of this series' strategy comes into view.
Trying to maintain domestic livestock under Japan's terrain, arable land, and fertilizer constraints is asking for what cannot be had. Then let countries where grassland livestock farming holds up topographically and climatically — Australia, the United States (Midwest, Rocky Mountain foothills), New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina — do regenerative grazing, and supplement the shortfall with their beef, lamb, and dairy through imports.
This is not "weak-kneed import dependence." It is a rational division of labor by comparative advantage at the global scale.
- Australia and the United States are geographically suited to grassland livestock farming: vast plains, relatively low population density, compatibility with mechanization
- Allan Savory's Holistic Management has already been demonstrated in these countries (mother cow mortality 5% → 1%, milk productivity 2.5×, Chapter 6)
- Farms like Gabe Brown's integrate no-till grain + cover crops + rotational grazing, and turn livestock operations profitable while massively reducing chemical fertilizer and pesticide use
- Their beef and dairy already circulate in world markets
Japan becoming "a major buyer nation of regenerative livestock products" has the following effects:
- By giving up livestock that is physically impossible domestically, precious arable land can be concentrated on producing food crops
- Creates economic demand for regenerative methods in international markets, pushing global livestock farming in a more sustainable direction
- As a result, the long-term sustainability of import sources also rises — regenerative grazing is more robust under fertilizer constraints than short-term chemical-fertilizer-dependent livestock
Postwar diets have been built on a consumption structure of nearly daily meat and dairy supported by imported feed. Under fertilizer constraints, this shifts toward the basic structure of Japanese cuisine — centered on rice, fish, beans, and vegetables, with meat and dairy not eaten daily.
It does not become an extreme restriction of "only on special occasions." It is the gentler change of simply no longer being the daily centerpiece. Eating meat or dairy several times a week — as seasonal pleasure, or for nutritional balance — that style becomes standard. That degree of shift.
In addition, as the volume drops, imported regenerative pasture meat enters as an option (often meeting standards like grass-fed, hormone-free, and antibiotic-free). It is a natural adjustment toward reducing volume somewhat and preserving quality.
This is not a problem nutritionally (the same structure as the wartime-Britain-rationing case touched on in Chapter 3, where nutritional status improved under rationing). The "combination of quantity and quality" simply gets gradually adjusted. From the perspective of lifestyle diseases of the era of plenty, the move away from excess also has welcome aspects.
Rather than depending on the prescription of Japanese-style circular livestock farming, the only path is to restructure: shrink the role of livestock itself, place plant protein and seafood at the center, and supplement the shortfall with imported regenerative pasture meat. This is the direction that fertilizer constraints and Japan's geography point to simultaneously.
4.3 Industrial Farming Is Not a "Choice" — It Ends Automatically. The Real Question Is Transition Management.
Apart from A (preserving conventional farming through government intervention) and B (full self-sufficiency), there is another extreme: C: reject chemical fertilizers and agrochemicals immediately, convert fully to organic / natural farming.
This position
- overlaps with Chapters 1–3 of this series in criticizing the structural rise in chemical fertilizer prices
- agrees on recommending a shift to microbe-based agriculture
But the binary itself — "immediate full abandonment vs. preservation" — misreads the actual structure.
There Is No Room to "Choose" Whether to Continue Industrial Farming
Because
Once phosphate fertilizer can no longer be imported, industrial farming cannot continue at all.
As we saw in Chapter 1,
- China's export halt (from March 2026)
- QatarEnergy's force majeure declaration and the logistics paralysis at the Strait of Hormuz
- Short-term implementation difficulty for sewage-sludge recovery due to PFAS regulation
three routes constrict at the same time. Self-sufficiency in Japan's chemical fertilizer raw materials is near 0%. If fertilizer stops arriving, conventional farming automatically becomes unsustainable.
This is not "choice"; it is structural inevitability.
In other words,
- A (preserve via government intervention) — fertilizer physically does not arrive, so subsidies cannot buy it
- B (full self-sufficiency) — neither fertilizer nor land suffices
- C (immediate full abandonment) — no room to choose whether to abandon; it ends automatically
All three become empty talk in front of the physical constraint of fertilizer supply.
The Only Remaining Question Is "How to Manage the Transition"
Because the end of industrial farming is automatic rather than chosen, the real question to debate is
How to manage the unavoidable transition without inviting a food crisis.
There is an important fact here. "Short-term yield collapse" is not an inescapable fate.
- Pull only chemical fertilizer from a monoculture → yield collapse
- **Convert via diverse intercropping (grasses + legumes + tough crops
- diverse cover crops)** → soil microbiome recovers in about 3 years and yield also recovers
- Fertilizer constraint → automatic contraction of industrial farming
- Food supply during the transition period (3+ years) is bridged by imports and precision agriculture
- → Whether transition management proceeds "by chosen method" or "without a plan" becomes the actual question
That is, both "immediate abandonment" and "preservation" are empty talk. The remaining question is
When and how to begin the gradual transition via diverse intercropping.
This is an implementation question.
Three Elements of Transition Management
To advance the unavoidable transition without a food crisis, combine three elements.
Element 1: Precision agriculture as a "bridge"
In the few years before chemical fertilizer stops entirely, use the limited fertilizer at maximum efficiency. Precision agriculture (variable-rate fertilization, slow-release fertilizer, AI pest and disease detection) is effective as a bridging tool that paces the withdrawal of chemical fertilizer.
That said, as detailed in Chapter 3, this is no more than "marginal optimization within a broken paradigm." The physical supply-chain constraints still bite, and the problems of profit extraction by platform operators and cost disadvantage relative to biological mining remain.
Precision agriculture is a tool to get through the few-to-ten-odd years of the transition period, not the destination.
Element 2: Imports as "transition-period food supply assurance"
While domestic production drops during the transition, imports cover the shortfall. The strategy of "international regenerative × imports" detailed in section 4.4 takes effect here.
Element 3: Gradual domestic transition to regenerative agriculture
Take time to restore the soil ecosystem and shift to a self-sustaining, biological-mining-type system. Detailed in Chapters 5–8.
Don't "throw away" industrial farming — "end" it. Pace the ending to the recovery speed of the soil ecosystem. Bridge the food supply during that interval with the efficiency of precision agriculture and with imports. This is the heart of transition management.
4.4 So Where Do We Stand? — A Combination of Three Strategies
A (preserve via government intervention, raise self-sufficiency), B (full self-sufficiency), C (immediate full abandonment) — every one becomes empty talk in front of the physical constraint of fertilizer supply.
The position, in one sentence:
Domestically, transition gradually to small-scale regenerative agriculture. At the same time, push regenerative agriculture internationally so that the world's major producing regions can keep producing sustainably even under chemical fertilizer constraints. Supplement the shortfall with imports from that re-distributed global supply network.
Strategy 1: Domestic — Gradual Transition to Regenerative Agriculture
The biological mining detailed in Chapter 5 — the self-sustaining system of mycorrhizal fungi + accumulated phosphorus + tough crops —
- can structurally reduce dependence on chemical fertilizer
- has structurally low running costs
- has sufficient productivity given soil and climate conditions
- can be implemented at the scale of individuals, families, and local communities (Chapter 7)
That said, this is small-scale and distributed and cannot replace the production volume of postwar industrial farming all at once. Single-tan farmers, restoration of abandoned farmland, balcony gardens, citizen farms — multiple scales stack up to support food production for the society as a whole (detailed in Chapter 7).
The pace of withdrawing chemical fertilizer can be accelerated by diverse intercropping, which speeds the recovery of the soil microbiome (about 3 years via intercropping conversion). Methods of precision agriculture are used in a limited way as a bridge for the transition period.
Strategy 2: International — Worldwide Promotion of Regenerative Agriculture
The major plains supporting world food production (the U.S. Midwest, Ukraine, Brazil, Canada, Australia) share the same chemical-fertilizer- constraint structure (detailed in Chapters 1, 2, and 7).
Fortunately, large-scale production via regenerative agriculture has already been demonstrated in many places around the world.
- Gabe Brown (North Dakota): 20+ years of no-till + cover crops, SOM (soil organic matter) from 1.7% → 11%
- Australia: more than 80% of total wheat area is no-till
- Argentina / Brazil: large-scale no-till soybean operations
- Allan Savory (Holistic Management): in grazing, mother cow mortality 5% → 1%, milk productivity 2.5×
- Tony Rinaudo (FMNR): regenerated 50,000 km² of land in Niger, with over 200 million trees growing
- Christine Jones (liquid carbon pathway): carbon fixation via root exudates is more than 5× that derived from above-ground biomass
These demonstrate that it is possible to reduce chemical fertilizer dependence on a global scale while maintaining mechanized mass production. The "destination" this series points to is shared globally.
What Japan can do is to push the world as a whole in this direction through
- domestic practice (small in scale, but accumulating know-how)
- international dialogue, research collaboration, and technical assistance
- market demand for regenerative agricultural products (preference in imports)
- policy support for international institutions and treaties
Strategy 3: Import Supplementation — From a Re-Distributed Global Supply Network
As the world transitions to regenerative agriculture,
- the long-term sustainability of major producing regions is secured (more robust to chemical fertilizer constraints)
- export capacity becomes structurally more stable (more robust than the current industrial type)
- the amplitude of price swings is suppressed (soil acts as a buffer)
- resilience to geopolitical shocks rises (departure from large-scale monoculture dependence)
Japan supplements the shortfall via imports from this internationally re-distributed and durable food supply network. Investing in the direction of making global food production more robust contributes more to long-term food security than aiming for closed full self-sufficiency.
Comparative Advantage by Important Item
The items to supplement via imports are those for which Japan's terrain, climate, and population density structurally make large-scale domestic production unfit.
| Item | Constraint in Japan | Suitable producing region | Strategy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grains and soybeans (mechanized, combine-harvested) | Terraced and stepped fields; large-scale mechanization impossible at 3.6 ha per management entity | U.S. Midwest, Ukraine, Canada, Australia | Major imports for the foreseeable future. Even more robust once the world transitions to regenerative |
| Beef, lamb, and dairy (grassland livestock) | 1 ha per head of cattle; terrain unsuited to continuous pasture | Australia, the United States (Midwest, Rocky Mountain foothills), New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina | Rely on imported meat produced via regenerative grazing |
| Oil crops (rapeseed, sunflower, etc.) | Need mechanization and economies of scale | Canada, Europe, the United States | Imports for both industrial and food use |
In short, "livestock Japan can't do" is done by countries that can. This is not strategic retreat — it is a rational division of labor by comparative advantage at the global scale.
Japan's precious arable land and labor concentrate on crops only Japan can produce — rice, traditional vegetables, fruit, soy products, miscellaneous grains, and locally specific regenerative crops. Grassland livestock farming is left to countries where it holds up geographically.
The Combination of Three Strategies
| Strategy | Role | Target | Time horizon |
|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic regenerative transition | Small-scale, distributed food production; soil restoration; regional resilience | Single-tan farmers, abandoned farmland, balcony gardens, regional communities | Stand up in about 3 years via diverse intercropping, then continue maturing |
| International regenerative promotion | Make global food production robust to chemical fertilizer constraints | Major producing regions (U.S., Ukraine, Australia, Brazil, Canada, NZ, Argentina) | A worldwide progression on the order of decades |
| Import supplementation | From "countries that can," what "Japan can't do" | Grains and soybeans, pasture-derived products (dairy), beef and lamb from grassland livestock | Continued for the foreseeable future, stabilized as the global transition progresses |
This combination of three is the "realistic position" this series stands on.
No single strategy alone realizes food security. Combining the three pillars — domestic × international × imports — across time is the only structurally workable solution.
4.5 The Cold Fact of Grain Allocation by Use
Here, one important fact often overlooked.
The grains produced in the world are not eaten directly by humans. They
are allocated by use in very different shares [numbers unverified].
| Grain | Food (direct) | Feed | Industrial (ethanol, etc.) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corn (U.S.) | ~10% | ~36% | ~40% (ethanol) |
| Soy (world) | ~6% | ~75–77% (oilseed-derived meal) | rest (oil, industrial) |
| Wheat (world) | ~65–70% | ~20% | rest |
This table shows that grain is not short because humans face a food shortage.
In the world, before the food for humans runs short, there is a large amount of
- corn diverted to bioethanol
- grain fed as feed to livestock
To put it bluntly, the slack in world food supply can be absorbed substantially by reducing livestock numbers.
This is not exhortation — it is a numeric matter.
Look at wartime Britain. During World War II, with imports restricted and rationing imposed, Britain improved national nutrition (a famous fact: nutritional balance under wartime rationing was better than peacetime working-class life). Why? Because grain that was being fed to livestock was redirected to humans, meat was reduced, and vegetables and grains were increased. Under supply constraints, humanity is in fact flexible at securing food.
Food is not in short supply. The portion going to feed, fuel, and luxury items is still very large.
This is not a normative argument that "you should not eat meat." It is a recognition of the fact that there is plenty of room for adjustment in an emergency.
4.6 Supplement the Shortfall with Imports — Don't Aim for 100% Self-Sufficiency
From this fact about grain allocation, the following judgment follows.
Japan does not need to aim for full self-sufficiency.
Including livestock feed and biofuel, world grain supply still has slack. Even if Japan abandons full self-sufficiency, the situation is unlikely to be 'food doesn't arrive' — only 'price rises.'
The problem is not "we cannot import" but "import prices rise."
And when prices rise, humanity adjusts. The U.S. may shift corn away from ethanol. Brazil may change soybean uses. China may increase imports of feed grain. The world market adjusts via prices.
As long as Japan can pay, imports continue. That is the reality.
The question is can we pay? This is where "the income statement of industrial farming collapses," from Chapter 3, takes effect.
If domestic agriculture stops penciling out, import dependence deepens. With import prices rising and dependence deepening, food costs soar. This bites household finances.
So:
- Don't aim for full self-sufficiency (physically impossible, and the world has slack)
- But maintain domestic production as much as possible (a hedge against import price spikes)
- Promote regenerative agriculture internationally to secure the long-term sustainability of import sources
This combination is the realistic position.
4.7 Transition Gradually to Methods That Do Not Depend on Chemical Fertilizer
What do we change to maintain domestic production? Decouple from dependence on chemical fertilizer.
As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, chemical fertilizer rises structurally. Methods dependent on it, as we saw in Chapter 3, do not pencil out.
There is only one way to decouple from dependence: move to methods that use the work of soil microbes.
This is not a normative argument. It is a substitution strategy: have soil microbes do the work that chemical fertilizer was doing (nitrogen fixation, phosphorus solubilization, mineral cycling).
The science behind this is the work of Christine Jones and others, seen in Chapter 5. Soil microbes — especially mycorrhizal fungi — can supply the bulk of the nitrogen, phosphorus, and minerals plants need without chemical fertilizer. This is becoming clear.
If chemical fertilizer becomes expensive, move to methods that don't use chemical fertilizer. But don't move on "spirit"; move on "science" and "economics."
This is the central claim of this series.
Summary of the Position
| Axis | Our position |
|---|---|
| Raising self-sufficiency via domestic production increases | Correct as a number, but preserves dependence on imported fertilizer and energy, so not a fundamental solution |
| Japanese-style circular livestock farming | Doesn't pencil out under fertilizer constraints. When even food rice is short, there is no room to grow feed rice; pasture requires 1 ha per head of cattle and is physically insufficient; without compound feed, pigs and chickens cannot be sustained. Livestock itself can only move toward substantial contraction |
| Full self-sufficiency | Don't aim for it. Physically impossible, and use the slack in the world market |
| Preserving / fully abandoning industrial farming | Neither is selectable. Once fertilizer doesn't arrive, industrial farming ends automatically. The question is not "whether it ends" but "transition management" |
| Domestic methods | Gradual transition to regenerative agriculture. Precision agriculture limited to a bridge for the transition period |
| International cooperation | Support the worldwide push for regenerative agriculture; invest in a re-distributed global supply network |
| Imports | Continue as supplement. In particular, grassland livestock products (beef, lamb, dairy) are imported from regenerative grazing in Australia, the United States, NZ, etc. — a rational division of labor by comparative advantage |
| Ethics / philosophy | Not at the center. Economics, physics, and biology decide |
This is the realistic position of this series — aligned with neither extreme.
In the next Chapter 5, we look in concrete terms — based on the work of Christine Jones and others — at why this strategy of "transitioning gradually to regenerative agriculture" is possible, and on what mechanism it holds: biological mining by soil microbes.
References
Grain allocation by use, historical cases
- USDA "Feed Grains Database" (U.S. corn allocation by use)
- Historical research on wartime British rationing and nutritional status
International demonstrations of regenerative agriculture
- Gabe Brown, Dirt to Soil: One Family's Journey into Regenerative Agriculture (North Dakota, SOM 1.7% → 11%)
- Australian Department of Agriculture — over 80% of total wheat area is no-till
- Argentina / Brazil — cases of large-scale no-till soybean operations
- Allan Savory, Holistic Management: A New Framework for Decision Making — mother cow mortality 5% → 1%, milk productivity 2.5× ha/year
- Tony Rinaudo (World Vision), FMNR (Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration) — Niger, 50,000 km², regeneration of over 200 million trees
- Christine Jones, Light Farming: Restoring Carbon, Organic Nitrogen and Biodiversity to Agricultural Soils (2018)
Structural data on Japanese agriculture
- Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries statistics (FY 2024–2025) — nationwide arable area 4.239 million ha; per-management- entity scale 3.6 ha (2.6 ha in prefectures outside Hokkaido, 33.7 ha in Hokkaido)
- News reporting on raw milk disposal in Japanese dairy (2025)